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# POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY.

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HARRINGTON

AND HIS INFLUENCE UPON AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS  
AND POLITICAL THOUGHT.

JAMES HARRINGTON has not the reputation as a political thinker that he deserves. This is partly due to some fanciful notions on his part respecting forms of government, partly to peculiarities of style, but principally to the fact that the republican theories for which he contended were discarded in his own country. He had no followers. He founded no school. Still, though overlooked and unrecognized in England, he led and inspired the views of early American statesmen. It is not too much to say that he has left a marked impression upon our political institutions. It is well to recall to view his merits in this centennial year of the birth of the United States Constitution.<sup>1</sup>

Before sketching the writings of Harrington, some general remarks may fitly be made concerning his age and his place in

<sup>1</sup> Reference is made in this paper not only to his principal work, *The Oceana*, but also to tracts written in support of it and setting forth his views upon other political questions. These are:

*The Prerogative of Popular Government.*

*The Art of Law-giving.*

*Valerius and Publicola.*

*Political Aphorisms.*

*The Ways and Means of introducing a Commonwealth by the Consent of the People.*

*The Humble Petition of divers well-affected Persons, with the Parliament's Answer thereto.*

The edition of his works referred to in this paper is by John Toland, printed at Dublin in 1737.

it. He lived at a time when a most heroic effort was making to put political institutions on their trial, to probe them to their foundations, and, where found defective, to put new ones in their place. English Puritanism is well described as having been not merely an effort to restore purity to religion, but also a protest against all authority as such, — a destructive and remorseless criticism, sparing no institution in the state which on trial could not give a good account of itself. It was something more, even, than this. It proposed, after destroying what was antiquated and useless, to set up not merely a new spiritual, but also a political kingdom, in which both the state and the church were to be re-established and brought into official relations, which it was fondly hoped would be harmonious as well as permanent. To accomplish this great result, everything must undergo revision. Nothing could be regarded as settled. The air was thick with the shower of controversial pamphlets falling on every side. Their titles were as quaint as their style was strange and uncouth. There was no question of literary culture or scholarly finish of expression. If a man had a burning word to say, he took his own mode of saying it. His merit, if any, was that he was dead in earnest ; and he very probably succeeded, even through the dimness of his utterances, in transferring to his readers a portion of the glow which he felt in his own heart. Most of these controversial works, once so thoroughly alive, are now dead and forgotten. There remain of them only single copies in the British Museum, that great mausoleum of literature. Their preservation is due probably to dry antiquarians, who rescued them from absolute forgetfulness not because they were intrinsically valuable, but simply because they were once new and now old. Out of all this mass, there remain some most noticeable writings. We are speaking of the time when the best thoughts of Thomas Hobbes, James Harrington, Oliver Cromwell, and John Milton were given to the world and were agitating the minds of their contemporaries.

Apart from the general interest, that we might have in the works of these and kindred spirits, they are particularly valuable in connection with the rise and growth of political ideas in this

country. These writers belonged to a party that had a powerful voice in framing the political institutions of the American people. They lived and flourished but a little more than a hundred years before the war of independence and the formation of the American constitution. The din of the great English rebellion and the rejoicings at its close had scarcely ceased to ring in men's ears, when our greater and more successful rebellion was inaugurated by men who had studied the writings of these great English radicals and had fully imbibed their spirit. Our statesmen knew the thoughts of Harrington and Hobbes and Milton, as we to-day know those of Washington, Adams, Hamilton, and Jefferson. John Adams was perfectly familiar with Harrington's *Oceana* and much influenced by its teachings, as his writings show us.

It has been supposed by many that the framers of our early political papers struck out some quite original thoughts — startling by their novelty as well as profound in their wisdom. The contrary is believed to have been the case. Instead of being originators, they were for the most part judicious copyists. Our own immortal constitution, when considered as to its specific provisions, is largely indebted to a judicious use of the scissors. Are its framers defining treason? They copy verbatim the words of an old English statute. Are they anxious to secure individual liberty? They copy from the English bill of rights. Are they concerned with the regulation of impeachments? They compliment the New York constitution of 1777 by incorporating its provisions with some special phrases of their own. In fact, they borrowed right and left, and so made up the splendid mosaic, called the United States constitution, emblazoned with all the insignia of liberty, and ornamented with the time-honored inscriptions of victory won from absolute power on many a hotly contested field, while all its parts are fitted together with an exquisite precision and with regard to its general effect. In one point it is defective, where it could gain little advantage from the lessons of an earlier political philosophy. That philosophy, as will be seen hereafter, affirmed that all political power resided with the people, but suggested no

adequate means of ascertaining its will in the supreme act of choosing an executive. A monarchy knows no means of settling a disputed succession but war. The great problem hitherto insoluble is, when the sovereign power rests with the people, and political parties are nearly balanced, to find out what machinery can be trusted to register correctly the votes for the executive head of the nation. The man who can invent and successfully introduce machinery of this kind, will certainly win the applause of his own generation, and may with reasonable expectation look forward to a political immortality.

The great political thinkers of the English commonwealth have had little or no recognition in England itself. When Charles II came to the throne, there was such a revulsion of feeling that liberal political thought was absolutely arrested. Cromwell's memory was execrated; Harrington's views were derided as those of an impracticable visionary; Milton hid himself in obscurity from a Parliament that would have imprisoned him if he had been visible. All the legislation of Cromwell and his associates ceased to have force. His name was omitted from the list of English rulers. To an English lawyer, Cromwell has no legal existence, Charles II having succeeded his father as king at the very moment of his execution. Cromwell was henceforward but a political nightmare. His was a name to conjure with and "fright the isle from its propriety." All over England he was "Noll" and "old Noll" in every variety of flunkey witticism which the scatter-brained courtiers of the time could invent. The head of the dead hero was placed on a pole over the very sanctuary of the law, Westminster Hall, in open derision of him who, more than any other Englishman of his time, had upheld the majesty of the law.

Americans, however, must learn to do justice to the great men to whom they owe so much. There is, doubtless, much rubbish in their writings. All this can readily be rejected, while the solid parts of their works richly merit attention. He who carefully studies them will be amply rewarded for his labor.

Without further preface I shall bring forward some notes upon the life and political philosophy of Harrington. For

information concerning his life I am largely indebted to his enthusiastic biographer, John Toland.

James Harrington, who was born in January, 1611, was descended from an ancient and noble family. His great-grandfather, Sir James Harrington, was the ancestor of many noblemen, including dukes, marquises, earls, and barons. James was in early life a member of Oxford University, and a pupil of the great Dr. Chillingworth, whose works are in logic invincible and in style unreadable. Harrington was inclined to travel, and learned some of the principles of liberty in Holland, and gained culture by journeys in France and Italy. He very early exhibited a spirit of independence. He was present on one occasion when the pope of Rome was consecrating wax lights. Though he desired one greatly, on finding that he must kiss the pope's toe as a preliminary to receiving it, he declined it, saying that as he had kissed the king of England's hand, he thought it beneath him to kiss any other prince's foot. On his return from his travels, we find him quietly settled in England, the comfort of his friends and the charm of the domestic circle. We get some very pleasing glimpses of his character. He was eager to improve the education of his sisters, discoursing to them at large on the best mode of promoting their intellectual development as well as their religious sentiments and grace in manners. He was of a very liberal and compassionate nature, and could not endure to see a friend want anything that he might spare ; and when the relief that was necessary exceeded the bounds of his estate, he persuaded his sisters not only to contribute themselves, but likewise to go about to the rest of their relatives to complete what was wanting. And if at any time they alleged that this bounty had been thrown away on ungrateful persons, he would answer with a smile that he saw they were mercenary, since they expected so great a return as gratitude.

It was such a man as this, having such engaging and lovable qualities, perhaps tinged with a slight melancholy, fond of study and not seeking after public employment, who was overtaken in his library and in the presence of his loving sisters and com-

panions with the horrors of civil war. We first hear of him as involved in the troubles of 1646, when the Parliament commissioners, having the king in their custody, desired Harrington to wait upon his Majesty as a person known to him and connected with no party or faction. He made himself highly agreeable by his elegant and instructive conversation, except that when they happened to talk of a commonwealth, the king "seemed not to endure it"—as one well might suppose. Harrington never concealed his republican principles; but, republican as he was, he accompanied the king on the scaffold. He was evidently one of those good and noble men, found in every revolution, who at one and the same time are on the left of the party of the Right, and on the right of the party of the Left, without compromise of dignity or sacrifice of principle.

After the king's death, Harrington went to his library and in solitude worked upon his *Oceana*. It was his great and cardinal thought, that political institutions are not accidental or arbitrary, but rather of historic growth; and that there are natural causes in society which produce necessary effects in moulding and shaping institutions. He reasoned, accordingly, that the troubles of the time were not to be wholly attributed to wilfulness or faction, nor altogether to the mismanagement of the king, but rather to a silent change which had been going on in England for centuries in what he termed the balance of property, "which was daily falling into the scale of the commons from that of the king, until the scale of the latter had well-nigh kicked the beam." The king endeavored to govern, according to the methods of his predecessors, by levying arbitrary taxes and compulsory assessments, while the people were sure to struggle for preserving the property whereof they were in possession, never failing in every contest to obtain more privileges and to enlarge the basis of their liberty. This great proposition, that empire follows the balance of property, Harrington is said to have been the first to make out. His biographer, Toland, in enthusiastic strain, pronounces it a noble discovery, equal to that of the circulation of the blood, or of printing, or of the mariner's compass. His great purpose, and

the object of his book, was to find out a mode of restoring the equilibrium, and to establish such orders and regulations in the state as "to make wicked men virtuous and fools to act wisely" — kind and benevolent enthusiast! While the printers were at work at his book, Cromwell's superserviceable adherents, thinking there might be something in it opposed to the Lord Protector's interest, had it seized, and conveyed it to the residence at Whitehall. Harrington invoked the good offices of Lady Claypole, Cromwell's favorite daughter, and by her interposition the book was speedily restored to him. In fact, Cromwell's friends had no reason for their suspicion. The work was dedicated to him with large-voiced praise. When he read it, he said, perhaps with a civil smile of contempt, that the gentleman would like to trepan him out of his power, but that what he got by the sword he would not quit for a little paper shot; and that while he disliked one-man power himself, he was only acting as a high constable to preserve the peace of the nation among the several parties.

After the restoration of Charles II, Harrington lived in a retired manner, as a person bound to no party or faction. He occupied himself in setting forth his political principles in other forms of expression, and particularly in reducing them to aphorisms. It was, however, a sin at this time to have been a republican. He was committed to the Tower of London, December 28, 1661, as having been engaged in treasonable practices. He begged delay for a few moments, that he might stick together the sheets of his *Aphorisms*; and then, without time to take leave of his inconsolable sisters, he was hurried to his place of confinement. Here he was long imprisoned without apparent cause, subjected to inquisitorial examinations without his tormentors finding anything against him except the theories in his writings. His health suffered under his confinement. He was finally released by a warrant from the king, but not until his faculties had become disordered. About the same time his fellow-republican Milton was suffering extreme sorrow on account of his blindness, and sung the solemn words, fitted also to the case of Harrington:



My hopes all flat, Nature within me seems  
 In all her functions weary of herself ;  
 My race of glory run, and race of shame,  
 And I shall shortly be with them that rest.

Harrington died September 11, 1677, having lived a little more than sixty-six years.

It is now time to consider the theories for which the *Oceana* still challenges our respect and admiration. The work is divided into a number of principal parts. The first is preliminary, treating of the general principles of government. Another shows more specifically the true art of making a commonwealth. Descending now to particulars, the author displays what he deems to be the true model for the commonwealth of England, under the name of "Oceana," and finally groups together the supposed benefits to be derived from his scheme.

Beginning with the true nature of government, he declares it to be an "empire of laws and not of men." This had been asserted, it is true, by philosophers of antiquity, but it had been forgotten or disowned. He reasserted it continually, brought it into notice, and made it the corner-stone of his system. To this may probably be traced the famous declaration in the constitution of Massachusetts, part 1, article 30 :

In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them ; and the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them ; . . . to the end *it may be a government of laws and not of men.*

Still, he continues, the fundamental laws may vary and be wise or unwise. Wherever they vest power, there is empire. Empire is either foreign or domestic. The latter, domestic empire, is founded on property, real or personal, land or money. Where the land is in the hands of one, there is a monarchy ; where it is owned by the few, there is an aristocracy ; where it is controlled by many, you have a commonwealth. Accordingly the throne of England began to shake when a great law<sup>1</sup> was passed in the time of King Edward I, permitting the nobility

<sup>1</sup> *Quia Emptores*, 18 Edw. I, c. 1.

to sell their estates. The same force is not attributed to money, because of its fugitive nature. This balance in land is termed by him an "agrarian" balance, and without it in some form a government, he argues, has no long lease of life. In a democracy it would seem that the ownership of land should be much subdivided, and a class of small freeholders introduced.

Here he touches upon the allowance of interest upon money in its relation to public policy. He says that interest (or usury) may sometimes be impolitic, as where the land allotments of the citizens are small, and the loan may overbalance the estate in the land. This was the real ground of the Mosaic prohibition. But in a country where merchandise is exercised it is so far from being destructive that it is necessary, else that which might be of profit to the commonwealth would rest unprofitably in private purses, there being no man that will venture his money but through hope of some gain, which, if it be so regulated that the borrower may gain more by it than the lender, usury (interest) becomes a mighty profit to the public and a charity to private men; in which sense we may not be persuaded by them that do not observe these different causes that it is against scripture.<sup>1</sup> These "men that do not observe" were probably such men as Bishop Jewel, who denounced in the most violent manner all interest as unscriptural and diabolical. His tirades are approved even to-day by a person so noted as John Ruskin.

Following this general line of thought, Harrington declares that it is not quite safe for a country to plant colonies abroad and to give the colonists full ownership of land; for, as he says, it gives a root to liberty abroad that may spring up foreign and savage, and be hostile to the mother-state. Speaking of some existing colonies, he says with remarkable foresight:

They are yet babes that cannot live without sucking the breasts of their mother-cities; but such as I mistake if, when they come of age, they do not wean themselves; which causes me to wonder at princes, that like to be exhausted in that way.

<sup>1</sup> Treatise on the Prerogative of Popular Government, p. 246.

It is not, however, in his view a complete statement to affirm that empire rests upon dominion over property. One must also have regard to the principles of authority, which are internal and founded upon "the goods of the mind." If any legislator can unite these in his government with those of fortune, he comes nearest to the work of God, whose government consists of heaven, the domain of the spirit; and earth, the domain of the body. It is sad to observe that the principles of power and authority — "the goods of the mind and of fortune" — do not meet or twine in the wreath or crown of empire. He now rises to a high plane and bursts out into an eloquent passage:

Wherefore if we have anything of piety or prudence, let us raise ourselves out of the mire of private interest to the contemplation of virtue, and put a hand to the removal of this evil from under the sun — this evil, against which no government that is not secured can be good — this evil, from which the government that is secure must be perfect. We have wandered the earth to find out the balance of power; but to find out that of authority, we must ascend nearer heaven or to the image of God, which is the soul of man.

He next affirms, that true political liberty consists in the empire of law and not in the mere fact of the existence of freedom. There must be security for its continuance. Here he crosses the path of the philosopher Hobbes, who had maintained that liberty is the same, whether the commonwealth be monarchical or popular. Hobbes had illustrated his ideas by saying that on the turrets of the city of Lucca in Italy there is inscribed in great characters the word *libertas*, yet no man can thence infer that a particular man has more liberty or immunity from the service of the commonwealth there than in Constantinople. Harrington aptly rejoined that this was but the case of the mountain in labor bringing forth an equivocation. He maintained a fine and accurate distinction to this effect: that no one obtains his liberty *from* the law, but rather *by* the law. The source of his liberty is from the God of nature; it is only made practically secure by the rule that no man can be controlled but by law, and that law, too, framed by every

private man, which by that means comes to be the liberty of the commonwealth.

At this stage of his discussion, he perceives that an objection will be raised to his theories highly difficult to answer. In fact, the core of the question is not yet reached. The objector will say: How will you bring it about that men, even in a popular government, will be willing to abandon their own individual interest and follow that course which is for the general advantage? Of course it would be a fine thing to persuade every man in a popular government not to carve for himself that which he desires most, but to be mannerly at the public table and to give the best from himself to decency and the common interest. In connection with this question, he hints at a great law of *self-sacrifice*. We may join with him in thinking that this is more truly the lamp of that framework we call popular government, than of the buildings which men frame with their hands for habitation or worship. His principal reliance is upon the establishment of such laws or orders as may give the upper hand in all cases to *common* rights or interests, notwithstanding "the nearness of that which sticks to every man in private." But how can the people to be governed be trusted to establish these great primordial laws? At this point he is driven to take refuge in the power of a single legislator to establish a constitution for his people after the ancient pattern set by Solon and Lycurgus. Referring to the then existing condition of England, he would expect that Cromwell would abdicate his one-man power and formally establish a commonwealth. This must be representative in any large state. The wise and the able men will naturally and necessarily come to the front, and the others, by an equal law of necessity, will yield to them. He goes so far as to say that if, in a hap-hazard way, you should bring twenty men together to form a commonwealth, about one-third would either be wise or at least less foolish than the rest, and that these upon acquaintance would be discovered and would lead the herd. There is thus a natural aristocracy of intellectual and moral worth, diffused by God through the whole body of mankind to this end and purpose, and therefore such as

the people have not only a natural but a positive obligation to make use of as their guides. These men form a natural senate, on which the legislator in establishing his government could lay hands. Their function would be to discuss, debate, give advice, and enlighten the people. The rest of the community would be represented by a popular body or assembly, whose office it would be to adopt or reject the advice given. Debating by the natural aristocracy, and selection by the people of the truth disclosed by their debates, is thus the great law of popular government. He says: "There is a party — a refined party — a nation in a nation, that must and will govern."<sup>1</sup> As a matter of detail, the senators were to be worth £100 per year, and to be elected by the people in their precincts.<sup>2</sup> Here we have the germ of a property qualification for legislators.

Harrington here struck out a great and novel truth, though we should now give it a wider application than he made of it. We would deem it impracticable to have two representative assemblies organized in such diverse ways. We would, however, agree that a large part of the duty of representative assemblies is not merely to pass laws but to discuss great and fundamental principles, while the discussions are to be submitted to the people for the purpose of moulding and guiding their general opinion. The value of this function of a popular assembly can scarcely be overestimated. Harrington failed to regard it from this modern point of view, as the immense capacities of the press in disseminating such information were then wholly unrecognized and unknown and in fact discountenanced and proscribed.

Three great practical measures are now recommended with a view to the preservation of an equilibrium in a popular government.

1. There must be a law limiting the amount of land which any man can own. In his own words, there must be a perpetual law, establishing and preserving the balance of dominion by such a distribution, "that no one man or number of men within the compass of the few or the aristocracy can come to overpower the whole people by their possessions in land." This is but a

<sup>1</sup> Valerius and Publicola, p. 485.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 483.

deduction from a principle before referred to. As dominion or empire depends on the ownership of land, care must be taken that ownership shall be widely distributed. If land is to be leased, he is much opposed to rack-rents.<sup>1</sup> "Racking of rents is a vile thing in the richer sort, an uncharitable one to the poorer, a perfect mark of slavery, and nips your commonwealth in the fairest blossom."

2. Care must be taken to prevent the magistracy from acquiring dangerous power. His expedient in this direction is such equal rotation or succession to magistracy, conferred for such convenient terms, as to take in the whole body by parts succeeding others through the free election or suffrage of the people. Here is the first sound of the doctrine destined hereafter to echo around the democratic world — "rotation in office" — not, however, in Harrington's view, for the sake of the officeholder, but for the sake of the people.

3. The suffrages of the people for their representatives must be given by secret ballot. "The election or suffrage of the people is most free where it is made or given in such a manner that it can neither oblige nor disoblige another, nor through fear of an enemy or bashfulness towards a friend impair a man's liberty."

Here are certainly three great principles, new, as applied to government in England: limitation in the ownership of land, rotation in office, and the secret ballot. While we in America have seen thus far no occasion, owing to our unlimited territory, to adopt the first, all the world knows what use we have made of the two last. We must pause to consider Harrington's views upon some of these theories more at large.

In insisting upon rotation in office, his leading thought was to fix specified terms of office for the principal officeholders, so that their official conduct might at stated intervals be brought before the people of the commonwealth for approval. If their conduct in office were disapproved, it should be the right of the people to relegate them to private life. To Harrington's suggestions may fairly be traced a clause in the constitution of Massachusetts:

<sup>1</sup> *Oceana*, p. 178.

In order to prevent those who are vested with authority from becoming oppressors, the people have a right, at such periods and in such manner as they shall establish by their frame of government, to cause their public officers to return to private life, and to fill up vacant places by certain and regular elections and appointments.<sup>1</sup>

But this was not all. He would organize the office, in most cases, so that it should never be vacant. In his scheme the office-holding body was to have a continuous existence. His thought was that on which the United States Senate is organized. One-third of the members holding every important office were to go out of office every year. The members of parliament and of the state council and even the city boards of aldermen were to be classified in this manner. By such an arrangement he thought he could reconcile the movement of the age with permanency of service. He resorts to an illustration :

The House, having at once blossoms, fruit half ripe, and others dropping off at full maturity, resembles an Orange tree, such as it is at the same time Spring and a Harvest too. The vicissitude of your Senators is not perceivable in the steadiness and perpetuity of your Senate.<sup>2</sup>

It was not with any desire to gratify the clamor of men out of office and desiring to get in that he accepted the doctrine of "rotation in office." It was, however, a part of his scheme that the officeholder should not be at once eligible to fill the vacancy occasioned by the expiration of his term of service, but should be ineligible for a specified period. His scheme somewhat resembles the rule applied to the election of sheriffs in New York. The immediate rotation would not be a fatal defect, though it would make the government very imperfect.<sup>3</sup> Though the phrase "rotation in office" is perfectly familiar to us, it was new in English politics, for in England office is in general deemed to be a matter of property. Harrington was eager to bring into prominence the fact that an office is in its nature a trust for the people, and urged that it should be surrounded with such safeguards as to keep constantly before the officeholder and the citizen its essential character.

<sup>1</sup> Mass. Const., part i, art. viii.      <sup>2</sup> Oceana, p. 140.

<sup>3</sup> The Prerogative of Popular Government, p. 314.

His theory is plainly shown by the objections made to it by John Milton, who had a plan of his own competing with it. Milton's scheme was to have senators chosen for life. In arguing in its favor, he remarks :

If it be feared that long continuance of power may corrupt sincerest men, the known expedient is, and by some [meaning Harrington and his supporters] lately propounded, that annually (or if the space be longer, so much perhaps the better) the third part of the senators may go out according to the precedence of their election, and the like number be chosen in their places, to prevent their settling of too absolute a power, if it should be perpetual [for life] ; and this they call "partial rotation." But I could wish that this wheel or partial wheel in state, if it be possible, might be avoided, as having too much affinity with the wheel of fortune.<sup>1</sup>

Milton then proceeds to argue that Harrington's plan will result in putting out a great number of the best and ablest members, and bringing in raw and inexperienced men, to the injury of public transactions, and thus nothing firm or steadfast can be expected from such a floating foundation.

The controversy between Milton and Harrington was greatly relished by the royalist wits of the time. A burlesque pamphlet was published by them purporting to be an answer by Harrington and his friends. Harrington is made to say to Milton :

As to *rotation*, I shall only add this : that a commonwealth is like a great top, that must be kept up by being whipped round and held in perpetual circulation ; for, if you discontinue the rotation, and suffer the senate to settle and stand still, down it falls immediately. And if you had studied this point as carefully as I have done, you could not but know there is no such way under Heaven of disposing the vicissitudes of command and obedience, and of distributing equal right and liberty among all men, as this of *wheeling*.<sup>2</sup>

But in spite of Milton's arguments and royalist jeers, Harrington's theories had come to stay, and we have learned by the experience of a hundred years that his plan of rotation is con-

<sup>1</sup> The Ready and Easy Way to establish a Free Commonwealth.

<sup>2</sup> Harleian Miscellany, IV, 179-186. This pamphlet purported to be printed by Paul Giddy, at the Windmill in Turn-again-Lane, 1660, and certified by Trundle Wheeler, clerk to the Rota.



sistent with permanence and the moulding influence of progressive public opinion. He would be a bold man who would now propose to abandon it.

More than all else, Harrington laid stress upon the secret ballot. In his travels in Italy, he had studied with care and greatly admired the political constitution of Venice and the ballot as he found it there. He wished to introduce it into England with some modifications, all leading to extreme intricacy of detail. In his collected works there is a very curious plate, showing the balloting by his senate for the leading offices of state. The great features are a combination of the "lot and the suffrage"—the lot narrowing the list of the competitors, and the suffrage selecting from the list thus narrowed. The lot provides a number of electors or nominators from the body of the senate. From the nominations, the senators make the selection. The lot for nomination is only an ingenious device for avoiding multiplicity of candidates and the scattering of votes. There is an elaborate apparatus of gold balls, and silver balls, and urns. When the votes are to be taken, the senators are represented in the plate as seated in rows upon benches with the great officers of state in front of them, while pages go up and down among the members with their ballot boxes, shouting out the name of the office and the candidates, whereupon

Every magistrate and senator holds up a little pellet of linen, as the box passes, between his finger and his thumb, that men may see he has but one, and then puts it into the same. The ballot box—consisting in the inner part of two boxes, being painted on the outside white and green, to distinguish the affirmative from the negative side—is so made that when your hand is in it, no man can see to which of the sides you put the suffrage nor hear to which it falls, because the pellet, being linen, makes no noise.

This little pellet of white linen, noiselessly doing its mighty work, is evidently the precursor of the later image of the "snow-flakes falling on the sod." If the person voted for gets above one-half of the votes, he is elected; if not, the other nominees are voted for in the same way. If no election takes place before sunset, the whole proceeding must be repeated the next day

through the medium of the nomination of newly chosen electors, for "this ballot-box is no juggling box, but an art that must see the sun." This is certainly a very slow way of voting, but it has the essential elements of the existing ballot. He was afraid of an objection, that his boxes would be too expensive, and enters into an elaborate calculation that they would only cost £25,000 for all England.<sup>1</sup>

But Harrington was no mere political thinker, contented with the discussion of abstract principles of government. He desired to apply his theories to the England of his own day — which he somewhat fantastically terms "Oceana," while Scotland figures as "Marpesia," and Ireland as "Panopœa." His characters appear under equally whimsical names, James I. being called "Morpheus," William the Conqueror "Turbo," and Cromwell "Olphaus Megaletor." He proceeds to sketch a particular constitution for England, defining and limiting political power. Here appears the first sketch in English political science of a *written constitution* limiting sovereign powers, an idea destined to become fruitful both in the United States and France. He has our modern notion of ratification by the people, instead of adoption merely by Parliament. He says, "The fundamental orders of the government may be consented to or subscribed by the people themselves, if their express pact shall be esteemed any additional security."<sup>2</sup> This was a great step forward, for even Magna Charta itself is to be regarded rather as ordinary legislation, subject to repeal and modification by Parliament, than as fundamental law, binding on Parliament itself. He justifies the provisions of his "constitution" by long speeches put into the mouths of his principal characters, and in particular introduces Cromwell under an assumed title of *archon*, and allows him an easy triumph by causing his supposed suggestions to prevail.

It is not the purpose of this review of Harrington's work to pay close attention to his specific plans for the government of the English of his day. In a history of political opinion, it

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> The Humble Petition of divers well-affected Persons, p. 545.

would be necessary to sketch them. This part of the work is the least successful, and has tended to becloud the residue. Its peculiar form as a state romance is probably due to the fact that Harrington wrote under some restraint. He could not tell in advance how Cromwell would receive his theories, and therefore disguised his views under the form of a political novel. A student will not, however, be prevented by the special and eccentric form of the work from detecting the treasure which is scattered through it. Von Mohl in his *History and Literature of Politics* has done Harrington but scanty justice. He dwells mainly upon the unpractical nature of his scheme of government for England, without paying attention to the numerous valuable suggestions to be found not only in the *Oceana*, but in other works. The present purpose is to develop Harrington's political principles, and pay little attention to the forms in which they are clothed. As soon as his *Oceana* was published (1656), he commenced an agitation for the actual adoption of its provisions by the proper authority. By 1658 he had interpreted and defended it from objections in other works. In July, 1659, a petition drawn up by him was presented by his supporters to the House of Commons, urging the adoption of a definite political constitution for England.<sup>1</sup> In this petition are some remarkable propositions. He asserts in so many words, "that the exercise of all *just* authority over a free people ought (under God) to arise from their own consent." Did not Jefferson, in drafting the declaration of American independence, have this sentence in mind? He made use of its very words in maintaining that governments derive their *just* powers from the consent of the governed. In this petition Harrington maintained "that those who govern must also be sometimes in the condition of the governed." This was a heavy thrust at the doctrine of kingship by divine right. "Otherwise," he says, "the governors will not be in a capacity to feel the weight of the government, nor the governed to enjoy the advantages of it." Going boldly onward, he sturdily maintained "that the supreme

<sup>1</sup> Masson, *Life of Milton*, V, 483. See petition itself in Harrington's Works (Dublin ed., 1737), p. 541.

authority could not properly be settled in any single assembly whatsoever, having the power of propounding, debating, and resolving laws." This was a bold stroke indeed, for the very body that he was petitioning was asserting the very power that he condemned, and was as tender of its prerogative as any frowning king or jealous aristocrat. But he insisted, in its very face, that a parliament should only exercise legislative power, and that a magistracy ought to be provided having the whole executive authority of the laws. He clearly propounded the theory that governmental powers are either legislative, executive, or judicial, and that being distinct they ought to be vested in distinct bodies with separate functions. Here he supplied the very life blood of an American commonwealth; for if we omit these ideas from one of our constitutions, we might as well omit the constitution itself. The parliament or legislative power should have perpetual succession or descent, and without any possibility of a death or a failure in its being. Parliamentary power ought never to die or dissolve, though the persons be annually changing. This is the theory of the United States Senate. As Mr. Buchanan well expressed it, "The Senate is to-day, constitutionally and legally, the same body that met for the first time in the year 1789."

Harrington then proceeded to sketch, constructively, the elements of the right constitution for England. There should be two houses of parliament, one more numerous than the other, each organized on his plan of periodically shifting members, and elected by the people in convenient districts. There are also some important declarations concerning religious liberty — to be noticed hereafter.

It is to the credit of the Parliament that it accepted with cordiality these very advanced views. Its speaker gave the petitioners the thanks of the House, as they saw, that "the petition was without any private ends and only for the public interest." From this time forward, the Harrington party resorted to all available agencies for the dissemination of their views. They issued showers of pamphlets. They circulated throughout the city of London an engraving of an assembly in

session and voting, dropping the little noiseless pellets of linen into the election urns. It was at this time that they founded their famous debating club called the "Rota," holding their meetings in a well-known coffee house. This was in 1659. Anthony Wood describes the meetings:

Their discourses about government were the most ingenious and smart that ever were heard, for the arguments in the Parliament House were but flat to these. This gang had a *balloting* box and balloted, how things should be carried by way of experiment (*tentamens*), which being not used or known in England before, upon this account the room was very full.<sup>1</sup>

Harrington was one of the prime men. Cyriack Skinner, the friend of Milton, was among them. We may picture these and other leading men, seated along the walls of the room in the fashion of a grave senate; some of their number drawing out golden and silver balls from urns to get the nominating committee; the coffee-house waiters acting as senate pages and taking in the little linen pellets,—all practising for the great popular senate of the future, much as an impatient groom and bride go through the marriage ceremony at home to gain self-possession when they confront the real audience at church. While they are thus engaged, a band of drunken fellows rushes in from the tap-room. These "did much affront the junto" and tear in pieces their order and minutes. Then a party of soldiers, who were there as auditors and spectators, begin to show their teeth and would have kicked the intruders down stairs. Harrington now steps forward and with his moderation and persuasiveness hinders them.

The doctrines set forth at the Rota were very taking, exciting apprehension among political leaders. "The greatest of the Parliament men hated this design of rotation and balloting as being against their power." The club rivalled that which was the germ of the future Royal Society as the centre of intellectual amusement in London.

It was an era of political chaos. Harrington compared the

<sup>1</sup> A. Wood, *Athenæ*, III, 1125, 1126, — quoted in Masson's *Life of Milton*, V, 484.

contending parties to a company of puppies in a bag, where, finding themselves uneasy for want of room, every one of them bites the tail or foot of the next, thinking that to be the cause of his misery. The members of the club, as one of the inducements to adopt the balloting plan, were constantly crying out that there was no possibility of the king's return. But they left out of account the grim and silent man on horseback from the north — General Monk. He soon showed himself a factor not to be ignored. With the return of the king, the reign of chaos ended, faction for the moment lost its voice, and one loud chorus of joy or seeming joy sounded over England, disturbed by no word nor even note of discord. Charles II came with his graceful and easy manners, with his courtiers and his harem, — and rotation in office, the golden balls, the black and green urns, the little noiselessly falling pellets of linen, and even the moderate and persuasive Harrington himself, with his grave, thoughtful and benevolent face and long flowing locks, straightway passed out of the sight and memory of that generation of men. But the idea of the secret ballot was destined to survive and to become fruitful. A little more than a hundred years later, the first constitution of New York alluded to the ballot at political elections in a tentative and experimental manner.

Whereas an opinion has long prevailed, among divers of the good people of this state, that voting at elections by ballot would tend more to preserve the liberty and equal freedom of the people than voting *viva voce*, to the end, therefore, that a fair experiment be made which of those two methods of voting is to be preferred,

Be it ordained, that as soon as may be after the termination of the present war between the United States and Great Britain, an act or acts be passed by the legislature of this state for causing all elections thereafter to be held in this state for senators and representatives in assembly to be by ballot, and directing the manner in which the same shall be conducted; and whereas it is possible, that after all the care of the legislature in framing the said act or acts, certain inconveniences and mischiefs unforeseen at this day, may be found to attend the said mode of electing by ballot, it is further ordained that if, after a full and fair experiment shall be made of voting by ballot as aforesaid, the same shall be found less conducive to the safety or interest of the state than

the method of voting *viva voce*, it shall be lawful and constitutional for the legislature to abolish the same.<sup>1</sup>

Though this experiment seemed so doubtful one hundred years ago, it is a singular evidence of the foresight of Harrington as applied to the affairs of a commonwealth, that there is no proposal in any influential quarter to abandon the ballot with its attendant imperfections and evils and to restore *viva voce* voting.

In England, balloting did not triumph until 1872, when it was applied to parliamentary and municipal elections. The greatest precautions are there taken to preserve Harrington's cardinal point of secrecy. The voter is protected from all inquiry as to his ballot, even in judicial proceedings. The existing English statute provides that "No person who has voted at an election shall, in any legal proceedings to question the election or return, be required to state for whom he has voted." After two hundred years or more, Harrington and his Rota club have triumphed even in England, and the ballot box has become the symbol of popular election.

Harrington was at extraordinary pains, while he kept the voting secret, to provide devices to keep it pure. "The purity of the suffrage," he writes, "in a popular government is the health if not the life of it, seeing the soul is no otherwise breathed into sovereign power than by the suffrage of the people."<sup>2</sup> As we have seen, he would allow no balloting except by daylight. He made his senators and others take an oath to hold a pure election. But he evidently had his misgivings about the whole subject, as good men have them to-day, and felt that the custody of the box could be safely entrusted only to men who were above fraudulent practices and who were sensible to the obligation of an oath. With all our elaborate devices we can do but little better than he did. In the long run, the question of purity in elections is one of honor and political honesty. We can only follow Harrington's example, and, raising our hands to heaven, swear that by every effort in our power the ballot

<sup>1</sup> N.Y. Constitution of 1777, sec. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Oceana, p. 120.

box shall be preserved not only from defilement by ourselves, but also by our neighbors, and that we will visit on those who pollute it — those who seek the life of the people, by depriving them of their sovereign power — penalties fit to express our horror of this crime of parricide. An enemy takes a nation's life by force ; a ballot-box stuffer takes it by fraud of the vilest kind, and the wretched traitor is not fit to live.

Our author gives one reason for his faith in the ballot which deserves special notice. He was firm in the belief that a commonwealth could only be carried on by gentlemen, by the "natural aristocracy," and that it would, as a matter of fact, be so carried on in England. "There is something," he says, "first, in the making of a commonwealth, then, in the governing of it, and last of all, in the leading of its armies which seems to be peculiar to the genius of a gentleman." And again : "It is in the universal series of history that if any man has founded a commonwealth, he was first a gentleman." He then calls over the roll of legislators, ancient and modern, down to his own time, including Oliver Cromwell, showing that they were all of gentle blood. He insists upon the same fact in the case of civil administrators and of generals. He expected this state of things to continue in England. He was not a socialist. He expected men of great landed wealth to continue in a commonwealth, though not men of unbounded fortune. In these and others he expected that the old sense of honor would survive, and that they would never violate an oath. Thus the ballot box would be safe in their hand. Our fathers at the time of the revolution had some of Harrington's belief. Says John Adams, after speaking of the relation of nobles to the safety of the state :

By nobles I mean not peculiarly a hereditary nobility but the *natural and actual aristocracy* among mankind. The existence of this you will not deny. You and I have seen four noble families rise up in Boston — the Crafts, Gores, Dawes, Austins. They are as really noble, except in power, as the Howards, Somersets, and Berties of England. It is a distinction which nature has made and we cannot abolish.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Letter from John Adams, in his Works, VI, 407.



"Natural and actual aristocracy" is an expression of Harrington's. His idea of nobility in a commonwealth appears in the following extract :

Your mechanics, till they have first feathered their nests, like the fowls of the air, whose whole employment is to seek their food, are so busied in their private concerns that they have neither leisure to study the public interest nor are safely to be trusted with it, because a man is not faithfully embarked in this kind of a ship if he has no share in the freight. But if his share be such as gives him leisure by his private advantage to reflect upon that of the public, what other name is there for that sort of men but nobility?<sup>1</sup>

In this review of Harrington's writings we have gone far enough to see that he is not merely a writer of a political romance, enamored with a fanciful plan of government. If that were the true conception of him, he would be entitled to little attention. The main grounds on which he can challenge the interest of this generation are the wisdom of his suggestions on various subjects of general interest, and the breadth of his views, far beyond those prevailing among the statesmen of his time. To some of these reference will be made.

He maintains the propriety, even in a democracy, of establishing limitations upon the people's will. To him the people is sovereign, the people is king. He cries out : "This freeborn nation, distributing her annual magistracies and honors, is herself KING PEOPLE."<sup>2</sup> At the same time he is apprehensive of danger if the people be uncontrolled. His words will bear quotation .

For as much as sovereign power is a necessary but a formidable creature, not unlike the powder, which is at once your safety and your danger, being subject to take fire *against* you as well as for you, it must be so collected as to be in full force and vigor and yet so distributed that it is impossible you should be blown up by your own magazine. Let them who will have it that power, if it be confined, cannot be sovereign, tell us whether our rivers do not enjoy a more secure and fruitful reign within their proper banks, than if it were lawful for them in ravaging our harvests to spill themselves. . . . Whether power not confined to the bounds of reason and virtue, has any other bounds than those of

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 135.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

vice and passion? Or if vice and passion be boundless and reason and virtue have certain limits, on which of these thrones holy men should anoint their sovereign?

Then follows this fine utterance: "The sovereign power of a commonwealth is no more bounded, that is to say, straitened, than that of a monarch, but is *balanced*." In other words, the checks and restraints upon the sovereign power of the people are to be self-imposed — are to be found in the provisions of the constitution.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, Harrington would restrict the participation of the people in the direct act of government. "For my part," he says, "where the people have the election of the senate, not bound to a distinct order" — here, of course, he glances at the House of Peers — "and the 'result,' which is the sovereign power, I hold them to have that share in the government (the senate being not for life), whereof with the safety of the commonwealth they are capable in nature, and such a government for that cause to be a democracy." And again: "A people reduced to misery and despair become their own politicians, as certain beasts when sick become their own physicians; but the people for the most part are beneath the beasts in the use of them." Observe that he has no idea of a pure democracy, but of a representative government, having powers conferred by the people under specific limitations.

Holding these views, he had the greatest faith in a faultless organization of the government. Practically he worshipped the constitution. In this respect he resembled some American statesmen, who seem to think that the country is safe if it can only be tied up with sufficient tightness in the bands of an unyielding constitution. "No man," he argues in his quaint way, "shall show me a commonwealth, born straight, that ever became crooked; nor shall any man show me a commonwealth, born crooked, that ever became straight."<sup>2</sup> And again: "A commonwealth, that is rightly instituted, can never swerve, nor one, that is not rightly instituted, be secure of swerving by reduction to her first principles."<sup>3</sup> This organization must involve as its basis equality before the law. "Equality, which

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 101.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193.

is the necessary dissolution of a monarchy, is the generation, the very life and soul of a commonwealth.”<sup>1</sup> He fondly hoped that his commonwealth should be immortal, seeing the people, being the materials, never die, and the form, which is motion, must, without opposition, be endless. So he compares a well-framed political scheme to the luminaries of heaven. “The bowl,” he exclaims, “which is now thrown, if there is no rub, no impediment, shall never cease, for which cause the glorious luminaries, that are the bowls of God, were once thrown forever.”<sup>2</sup>

Among other things, he laid great stress on military power and the correct conduct of war. The council of state was to have no power to engage the commonwealth in war without the consent of the senate and the people.<sup>3</sup> War was to be a legislative and not an executive act, as it is under the provision of the United States constitution. It was to be waged, when declared, with the heaviest possible forces. To make war with small forces is not husbandry, but a waste, a disease, a lingering and painful consumption of men and money. “The Romans, making theirs thick, made them short, and had little regard to money, as that which they who have men enow can command where it is fittest that it should be levied.”<sup>4</sup> The whole responsibility of a battle should be cast on the general in command. He says with great force: “Let a council of huntsmen, assembled beforehand, tell you which way the stag shall run, where you shall cast about at the fault, and how you shall ride to be in at the chase all day; but these may as well do that, as a council of war direct a general. The hours, that have painted wings and of different colors, are his council. He must be like the eye, which makes not the scene, but has it so soon as it changes.”<sup>5</sup> Here he but anticipates the judgment of our own greatest general. “The only eyes a general can trust are his own.”<sup>6</sup> In case of extremity, the last man in the nation should be subject to levy, “to the end that the commonwealth,

<sup>1</sup> *Oceana*, p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> General Grant.

in her utmost pressure, may show her trust that God in his justice will remember mercy by humbling herself and yet preserving her courage, discipline and constancy to the last drop of her blood and the utmost farthing.”<sup>1</sup>

The commonwealth, for this and other reasons, must in his view, if driven to extremity, have a dictatorial power. He even went so far as to devise a regular means for its exercise. He admitted its danger, but held that without it the state could not be safe from falling into dissolution. His argument is substantially as follows. The orderly course of a commonwealth can only be determined by debate, which involves slowness and openness. Suddenness of assault requires instant action and secrecy. It would be well in your constitution to provide for secret and swift methods, lest, if you practise the violation of your fundamental law to meet special emergencies, your commonwealth may at last come to be dissolved. Here are words pregnant with wisdom, suggesting crises which we were obliged to face in the late civil war. It is fortunate that we have in our time a reserve power, such as he in substance indicated, in the possibility of amending our constitution. We may thereby avoid the tendency towards a dictatorship in critical times, which he so much dreaded and yet deemed so likely to occur.

Desiring as he did to keep a constant supply of the forces necessary to preserve society from decay, he was a firm believer in general education.

A man is a spirit, raised by the magic of nature : if she does not stand safe and so that she may set him to some good and useful work, he spits fire and blows up castles ; for where there is life there must be motion or work, and the work of idleness is mischief, but the work of industry is health. To set men to this, the commonwealth must begin betimes with them or it will be too late ; and the means whereby she sets them to it is education, the plastic art of government.<sup>2</sup>

One of the leading laws for the government of his proposed commonwealth was, that a sufficient number of *free schools* were to be erected and endowed in every division of the new nation, with a strict inspection of the schoolmaster's manner of life

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 176.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 171, 172.

and teaching, and of the proficiency of the children, after the manner of the great school at Westminster. A parent having more sons than one was to be punished if he did not send them to school, the education being "*gratis*" if he was not able to pay for it. This rule was to continue until the age of fifteen. After that the child should be made an apprentice to some trade, or be sent to a law-school or a university. The commonwealth still had an interest in him, for he must not stay beyond the age of eighteen unless he was fitting himself for some profession, the object being to prevent one's occupying himself with aimless study. If he travelled, he should on his return prepare a paper containing an account of the public interest, or form of government, of the states he had visited. If well done, this was to be printed and published at public expense with a "line in commendation" of the author.<sup>1</sup> This is a remarkable instance of an early plan, both for free and compulsory education. Harrington was a great friend of university education, and could not understand the motives of men who opposed it. He says: "We cut down trees to build houses, but I would have somebody show me by what reason or experience the cutting down of an university should tend to the setting up of a commonwealth."<sup>2</sup> The statesman that he fancied must have a wide education. He must not only have the knowledge of the schools, but he must be a historian and a traveller. His argument here is somewhat curious. "Except a man can see what must be or what may be, he is no politician. Now if he has no knowledge in history, he cannot tell what has been; and if he has not been a traveller, he cannot tell what is; but he that neither knows what has been nor what is, can never tell what must be or what may be."<sup>3</sup> The great fault of his time was that the people had little education. He was never weary of saying that a commonwealth is the estate of the people, and a man, though he be virtuous, if he does not understand his estate, may run out or be cheated out of it. "In

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 173.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>3</sup> So John Rushworth says: "I take it to be the great business of every man's life to learn what the world is, and what hath been done and what is doing in it, and upon the whole to judge what he ought to do."

fact," he said, "the grantees of his age, that laughed out openly at a commonwealth as a most ridiculous thing, would be regarded as mere idiots if the people only had eyes."<sup>1</sup> Laying so great stress upon intelligence, he considered it to be a great part of the duty of the senators to instruct the people. Some man, selected for his wisdom, was from time to time to deliver an oration or a lecture on the nature of popular institutions, either in the Parliament House, while the members were in town, or in some grove or sweet place in the field, while the Parliament shall, in the heat of the year, reside in the country.<sup>2</sup> He would thus keep the system of government fresh in men's memories. It was of the highest importance that his senators should be possessed of the graces of rhetoric and elocution, particularly when treating with some other nation that was "good at it, lest the advantage might remain with the merit of the art rather than with the merit of the cause."<sup>3</sup> He would even have in the government a department of affability, where the members of an academy should assemble every day towards evening, in a fair room with certain withdrawing rooms, and where all sorts of company, that will repair thither for conversation or discourse on matters of government news or intelligence, shall be freely and affably received and heard in the way of civil conversation, which is to be managed without any other awe or ceremony than is thereto usually appertaining, to the end that every man may be free, *etc.* Would it not be a relief to have a "bureau of affability" at our railroad and other business offices, and perhaps even in some of our governmental departments? He rhapsodizes upon the element of beauty in the administration of public affairs :

Upon beauty, in which every man has his fancy, we will not otherwise philosophize than to remember, that there is something more than decency in the robe of a judge that could not be well spared from the bench, and that the gravest magistrate to whom you can commit the sword of justice will find a quickness in the spurs of honor, which if they be not laid to virtue, will lay themselves to that which may rout a commonwealth.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 160.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157.<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122.

In order to secure the best officers, he would pay competent salaries. "He that lays his hand to the public plough is not to lose by taking it off from his own." He denounces a commonwealth, that is close in this direction, as penny-wise.<sup>1</sup>

His utterances concerning religion breathe a lofty spirit of toleration. While he desires that the Christian religion be established by Parliament and public preachers maintained, yet he insists that all that profess this religion, though of different persuasions, should be equally protected in its peaceable profession and public exercise, and be equally capable of all elections, magistracies and preferments in the commonwealth. He exclaims that without liberty of conscience, civil liberty cannot be perfect; and that without civil liberty, liberty of conscience cannot be perfect.<sup>2</sup> Liberty of conscience, he argues, will not suffer any coercive power in the matter of religion to be exercised in the nation. The teachers of the national religion are only to be those who voluntarily undertake their calling, and their hearers no other than those who voluntarily listen to them; and no gathered congregation is to be molested or interrupted in their way of worship, but vigilantly and vigorously protected in the enjoyment, practice and profession of the same. Here is an established religion with a perfect liberty of dissent. It says: The state will provide for you (the people) the ablest religious teachers. Do as you will about attending their services. According to Harrington's plan, the universities were to send probationers to churches for a single year. After that period, the people were to decide by ballot whether the minister was likely to be useful — a two-third vote in his favor being necessary.<sup>3</sup> There were no advowsons in his church; no patrons who could force a rector upon an unwilling people. His were free congregations, free to elect or reject their pastor. To this liberty of worship were two important qualifications. It did not extend to Jews nor to Roman Catholics. Not to Jews, for they were not then by public men deemed to be within the scope of rules applicable to Christians; not to Romanists, because of a jealousy of interference by a *foreign*

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> Valerius and Publicola, p. 489.

<sup>3</sup> Oceana, p. 88.

*prince* with his plan of government for England. It was his belief, as a statesman, that the then existing notions of allegiance to the pope, considered as a temporal monarch, entertained by many Roman Catholics, were inconsistent with due loyalty to the nation of which they were members. This may be called "limited toleration," but it was far beyond that of most men of his age. It was adopted by John Milton in his later years (1673). Professor Masson expresses Milton's view in these words: "*Until* and *without* the acceptance of the scriptures, no liberty of conscience; *after* and *with* that acceptance, all liberty" — except to Roman Catholics.<sup>1</sup> It would be interesting to know whether this modification of Milton's earlier views was due to the influence of Harrington. They could easily have been brought together, Cyriack Skinner being an intimate friend of both.

This was a broader platform than had been then proposed by the most liberal sects of the non-conformists. It stands in the most marked contrast with the bitter and intolerant legislation of the early years of Charles II's reign, when deviation from the established religion, by Protestant non-conformists as well as others, was visited by deprivation of important civil rights as well as severe punishment. Harrington's theory was, that the only source of true religious light was in the scriptures open to all men — not in translations, but in the original languages.

While Harrington was thus maintaining liberty of conscience, he was conscious of the religious bigotry and one-sidedness of his age, and implored the church to raise up her hands to heaven for further light.<sup>2</sup> He had little confidence in the *political* wisdom of the clergy as a body. He would not allow them to exercise any political power. We find in the *Oceana* this remarkable provision :

To the end that there be no interest at all, whereby the divines or teachers of the new religion may be corrupted or corrupt religion, they shall be capable of no other kind of employment or preferment in this commonwealth.<sup>3</sup>

This seems to be the parent of a clause long in the constitution of the state of New York :

<sup>1</sup> Masson's Life of Milton, VI, 697.

<sup>2</sup> *Oceana*, p. 89.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127.



And whereas the ministers of the gospel are by their profession dedicated to the service of God and the cure of souls and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their function, therefore no minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination whatever shall at any time hereafter, under any pretence or description whatever, be eligible to or capable of holding any civil or military office or place within the state.<sup>1</sup>

This was continued in the constitution of 1821, but disappeared in 1846. Harrington could not, though a "commonwealth man," have his belief hampered by any ecclesiastical system, whether episcopal or presbyterian. He says: "To make a man in matter of religion engage to believe no otherwise than is believed by my Lord Bishop or Goodman Presbyter is a pedantism, that has made the sword to be a rod in the hands of schoolmasters."<sup>2</sup> He was severe on ministers for political writing. "I wonder why ministers of all men should be perpetually tampering with government. Their honest vocation is to teach children at the schools and the universities and the people in the parishes. The state is concerned to see, that they do not play the part of shrews."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> N.Y. Constitution of 1777, art. 39.

<sup>2</sup> Oceana, p. 59.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 182. — Some of the ministers of Harrington's time certainly had small respect for Cromwell's authority, and seem to have been quite beyond governmental control. Thurloe (Secretary to Cromwell as Protector) gives an account of a discourse by one of them (Rev. Mr. Feake) who preached, at All-Hallows, London, three hours in his presence in 1657. He had been extremely troublesome to the Protector, and had been kept under guard at Windsor Castle in a chamber, but persisted in preaching out of the window while the governor and people were passing from St. George's Chapel. The governor prohibited him, but still he went on. Then, as Feake said, the governor "caused his drum to be beaten to drown the sound of the gospel. Then as soon as the drum had done, I began to sound out my trumpet, and trumpeted out the gospel aloud; he beat up his drum a second and a third time, and still I went on. Then he strictly required me to have done. I told him, I would not. He said he had order to silence me from the Lord Protector. I told him I had orders from my Lord to go on, and *my* Lord's Highness is above *his* Lord's Highness, *etc.* Then, it being nigh noon, he left me and I suppose went to dinner, while I went on preaching the gospel." "Strange government," he adds, "that men's mouths must be stopped from preaching." He was then moved to another castle, whereupon he fell to preaching to the soldiers who guarded him on the way. Finding poor accommodations here, with a pillow of hops (perhaps to lull him to sleep), he chose to lie at night on the boards without pulling off his clothes, and afterwards preached from Nehemiah on the following text: "Neither I nor my brethren nor the men of the guard, which followed me, none of us put off our clothes, save, that every one put them off for washing." "This text," he declares, "was a great comfort to us."

The subject of primogeniture attracted our author's attention. He did not deem it consistent with republican forms of government. His rule was equality in inheritance among claimants in equal degree of relationship to an ancestor.<sup>1</sup> Primogeniture was well-suited to a monarchy. He puts his arguments into the mouth of Cromwell :

A man has one son — let him be called. Would he enjoy his father's estate? It is his, his son's, and his son's son's after him. A man has five sons — let them be called. Would they enjoy their father's estate? It is divided among them. . . . If a man shall dispute otherwise, he must draw his arguments from custom and from greatness, which was the interest of the monarchy, not of the family, and we are now a commonwealth. If the monarchy could not bear with such divisions, because they tended to a commonwealth, neither can a commonwealth

Finally, Cromwell being at his wit's end to know what to do with him, named a town near the sea, where he must abide. Of this direction, Feake says: "And he wrote an order all in his own hand to be delivered to me, enjoining me to continue at that place, and not to stir from thence till further order, which order was signed, Oliver P." (Protector). This order stirred Mr. Feake's bile beyond measure. He paid no attention to it, and went up to London. He says: "He, Cromwell, was pleased to appoint me to be my own gaoler. Such an unnatural order was never heard of before." Here he read it to the congregation, and added: "I abhorred to be a prisoner voluntarily to any power in the world. Here was an order from Oliver P., and I sought the scriptures how to relieve myself. At length came into my mind the case of Peter and John in the 4th of the Acts, who being called before the high priest Ananias [*sic*!] and Caiaphas, were by them commanded not to preach in the name of Jesus. Now suppose that either of their Highnesses had sent Peter and John an order, enjoining them to confine themselves to such a village as Sharon or Joppa or the like, and forbear coming to preach at Jerusalem; suppose, I say, an order had come to them on that account, signed by either of their Highnesses, Ananias H. or Caiaphas H., like this with Oliver P., do you think they would have obeyed it and been confined to a village? We find the contrary, for they preached the more boldly in the city of Jerusalem. Then, having my warrant here from the scripture, I resolved for London, notwithstanding the order of Oliver P." Feake proclaimed that the churches were corrupt, and his business was to "rouse and to rattle them." Harrington's feeling towards the political action of ministers must be read in view of such discourses. Incidentally this matter sheds some light on Cromwell's mode of government, in that such a man should be allowed to rant before a large audience and for three hours, apparently in the presence of the Secretary of the commonwealth, without any interruption, except by other ministers. The sympathy of the audience was plainly with Feake. The narrator of this account found trouble in reporting Feake, as he was "far from candle light, and his shoulders were laden with a crowd of women riding over his head on the tops of the seats." — Thurloe's State Papers, by Birch, V, 755. London, 1742.

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 102.

conceive at such accumulations, because they tend to a monarchy. . . . I confess I marvel much how it comes to pass that we should use our children as we do our puppies, — take one, lay it in the lap, feed it with every good bit, and drown five ; nay, yet worse, forasmuch as the puppies are once drowned, whereas the children are left perpetually drowning. Really, my Lords, it is a flinty custom ; and all this for his cruel ambition that would raise himself a pillar, a golden pillar for his monument, though he has children, his own reviving flesh and a kind of immortality.<sup>1</sup>

It is a striking illustration of the correctness of his views, that while primogeniture once prevailed in eight of the American colonies, it disappeared in seven of them at the time of the Revolution. In connection with this discussion, he pours out a strain of invective and sarcasm upon the miserable custom then and since prevailing of the interference of parents to make mercenary marriages, which he holds to be pernicious to the commonwealth.

We see the gifts of God and the bounties of heaven in fruitful families through this wretched custom of marrying for money become their insupportable grief and poverty. The tallow of a chandler is soon converted into that beauty which is required for a bride. We insist that our children shall not marry without our consent, not for our tenderness over them, but lest we miss this and that thousand pounds in their fortune ; and yet it is a mischief beyond any that we can do to our enemies, in that we persist in making nothing of breaking the affection of our children. . . . Let us so frame our government as to render a homage to pure and spotless love, whereupon the marriage-bed will be truly legitimate, and the race of the commonwealth not spurious.<sup>2</sup>

In all his suggestions the interest of the commonwealth is the specific point of view. To that everything must bend. Political power is an awful responsibility. Magistracy is a trust to be constantly supervised. “As an estate in trust becomes a man’s own if he be not accountable for it, so the power of a magistracy not accountable to the people from whom it was received, becoming of private use, the commonwealth loses her liberty.”

He is watchful over the smallest detail injurious or dishon-

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

orable to the state. He cannot bear to see a decline in culture and refinement. He cannot go along with his compatriots in their despoiling of parks and defilement of cathedrals. The destruction of such ornaments and works of historic interest is really anti-democratic, for the people have a right to them as a means of education. He says :

There is such a selling, such a Jewish, humor in our republicans, that I cannot tell what to say to it, only this—any man that knows what belongs to a commonwealth, or how diligent every nation in that case has been to preserve her ornaments, and shall see the waste lately made in the woods adjoining to this city [London] which served for the delight and health of it, being cut down to be sold for three pence, will tell you that they who did such things would never have made a commonwealth.

Can it be that the genius of democracy is always and everywhere to be put forward as insensible to park and sylvan beauty?

But [he continues] the like may be said of the ruin or damage done upon our cathedrals—ornaments in which this nation excels all others. Nor shall this ever be excused upon the score of religion, for though it be true that God dwells not in houses made with hands, yet you cannot hold your assemblies but in such houses, and these are of the best that have been made with hands. Nor is it well argued that they are pompous and therefore profane or less proper for divine service, seeing the Christians in the primitive church chose to meet with one accord in the temple, so far were they from any inclination to pull it down.<sup>1</sup>

It was a bold thing for Harrington to put these words into the mouth of Cromwell, when he must have known that Cromwell was well aware that his soldiers had often without necessity desecrated the churches of the old established faith. It is doubtful whether even his contemporary, Milton, with his grand poetic vision, would have expressed so keen a sense of the Vandalism of the time as Harrington does in this passage.

Harrington is strongly in favor of recreations. Wit and gallantry are not to be proscribed, though care is to be taken to preserve their innocence. No curb should be placed upon the

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 168.

genius of a people in lawful recreation. He had heard "Protestant ministers in France much blamed, by men that were wise and of their own profession, in that they forbade dancing, a recreation to which the genius of that air is so inclining that they lost many who would not lose that."

Where a commonwealth was rightly "balanced" and conducted by virtuous men, our author had a glorious vision of its possibilities. He argues :

A government of the right make is a commonwealth for increase. Of those for preservation merely, the roots are narrow, such as do not run, have no fibres, their tops weak and dangerously exposed to the weather, except you chance to find one as Venice planted in a flower pot, and if she grows, she grows top-heavy and falls too. But you cannot plant an oak in a flower pot. She must have earth for her root and heaven for her branches.<sup>1</sup> . . . If your liberty be not a root that grows, it will be a branch that withers.<sup>2</sup> . . . But even if there should be disaster and the hand of God be upon her for her transgressions, she shall mourn for her sins and lie in the dust for her iniquities without losing her manhood.<sup>3</sup> . . . A commonwealth is not made for herself alone, but given as a magistrate of God to mankind for the vindication of common right and the law of nature.<sup>4</sup>

The stimulus to a citizen in a truly organized commonwealth is intense. "She drives her citizens like wedges, there is no way with them but *thorough*, nor end but that glory whereof man is capable by art or nature."<sup>5</sup>

Having completed his scheme, he breaks out into a grand and triumphant strain, in which he shows his affection for England and his faith in her future greatness. Cromwell is represented as making a harangue at the head of his army, and congratulating them on the adoption of the political constitution embodying Harrington's views.

My dear Lords, Oceana [England] is as the rose of Sharon and the lily of the valley. As the lily among thorns, such is my love among the daughters. She is comely as the tents of Kedar and terrible as an army with banners. Her neck is as the tower of David, builded for an armory,

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 192.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 183.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 194.

whereon there hang a thousand bucklers and shields of mighty men. . . . Arise, Queen of the earth, arise, holy spouse of Jesus, for lo, the winter is past, the rain is over and gone, the flowers appear on the earth, the time for the singing of birds is come and the voice of the turtle is heard in our land. Arise, I say, come forth and do not tarry.

All this outburst of gladness and upspringing of a new and virgin beauty come from his own scheme of government, which, in his fine philosophic simplicity, he regards as perfect.

Excellent patriots [Cromwell is supposed to continue], if the people be sovereign, here is that which establishes their prerogative ; if we be sincere, here is that which disburdens our souls and makes good all our engagements ; if we be charitable, here is that which embraces all parties ; if we would be settled, here is that which would stand and last for ever.

As has been already seen, Harrington's scheme demands that it should be launched by Cromwell, as sole legislator, who must voluntarily lay down his power as protector, to become at most the president of a commonwealth. To induce him to take such a step of self-abnegation, Harrington seeks to dazzle him with his prospective glory and the filial affection of his grateful fellow-citizens.

He shall walk the streets with a switch, while the people run after him and pray for him ; he shall not wet his foot ; they will strew flowers in his way. He shall sit higher in their hearts and in the judgment of all good men than the kings that go up stairs to their seats ; he has two or three hundred thousand men, that when you say the word, shall sell themselves to their shirts for him and die at his feet.

Is this not the first note of the mighty refrain heard in our own day ? —

We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more.

The next sentence, as applied to a faithful republican ruler, is equally prophetic :

His pillow is of down and his grave shall be as soft, over which they that are alive shall wring their hands, and the eyes of the people are as the showers of autumn.

Assuming that Cromwell pursues his suggestion, he looks forward to the fiftieth year of a successful republic, when the great legislator is made to die at the ripe age of 116, and a monument is erected to his memory by his grateful fellow-citizens in the form of an equestrian statue in the plaza in front of Westminster Hall, on the pedestal of which are inscribed the words: "The father of his country, invincible in the field, inviolable in his faith, unfeigned in his zeal, immortal in his fame, the greatest of captains, the best of princes, the happiest of legislators, the most sincere of Christians, who setting the kingdoms of earth at liberty, took the kingdoms of heaven by violence." What a contrast between this supposed national tribute and the actual destiny of the desecrated head, placed a few years later upon a pole on this very Westminster Hall, the object of derision and vile jests, as it slowly went through the process of decay!

How it would have gladdened the eyes of this wise old philosopher and sterling patriot if he could have prolonged his life for a hundred or more years, and could have followed, with eager and intensely loving gaze, the deeds of those men of his own race who, to enjoy the privileges he had held out to them as appertaining to a commonwealth, had crossed the sea and subdued a wilderness to the arts of peace! He would have seen a great general, having all the virtues attributed by him to the mighty Cromwell, doing what he had suggested, laying down his victorious arms and dismissing from service his devoted army to frame a constitution and become the president of a commonwealth. By and by he would have seen this man quietly push aside the presidential power and withdraw into the ranks of private citizenship, lending thus the weight of his example to Harrington's rule — that it is well to be governed as well as to govern. And when this nobler Cromwell — this man after Harrington's own heart — lay dying in the little back room in his family mansion, his last gaze resting upon the noble and tranquil river that flowed forward as peacefully as his own life ebbed away, our philosopher would in his mourning rejoice to know that the eyes of millions of grateful people

“became as the showers in autumn.” Had it been Harrington’s good fortune to address a Washington instead of a Cromwell, it is not impossible that the course of the world’s history would have been changed.

We can spend but a moment in gathering up some of the lessons fairly to be derived from these remarkable treatises. The prime feature of Harrington’s scheme is that a government can be made to run forever, if there is only good machinery, well oiled, and of the most improved pattern. Make a perfect equilibrium of forces on paper, regulate the ownership of land, cause your magistrates to rotate in office, cast your suffrages by secret ballot, have a well-drawn constitution, with all the powers of government sharply defined and vested in distinct persons, and your government, once set in motion, must go on forever. Alas, we have tried nearly all of these, and is our system of government yet perfect or absolutely secure? We have had the so-called secret ballot this hundred years; we have rotated our magistrates with the most perfect regularity; we have had an admirable constitution. All these are of admitted value. And yet, can it be said with truth that we confide in them as an absolute security? With them we have passed with difficulty and sorrow through the most tremendous civil war the world has ever seen. We have seen abundance of corruption in office, and fraud in the ballot box. We are conscious of dangerous forces in society which none of these political devices have any tendency to remove. We must, as thinking men, pause and inquire whether we are not too fondly reposing for our security on constitutional checks and limitations. The ruling idea of many is substantially this: If a legislature is foolish or corrupt, make it wise and pure by shackling it with constitutional restrictions. In some of the states the legislative power is almost choked, so tightly drawn are these leading-strings. By and by they will have to be relaxed, and the old evils will return. A qualifying feature of Harrington’s work must not be forgotten in forming a correct estimate of its value. It was all along assumed by him that his cherished constitution would only be managed by such men as he saw around him, and such



as he himself was, fearing God, hating covetousness. "The saintship of a people as to government consists in the election of magistrates fearing God and hating covetousness. It consists in making the most prudent and religious choice men can."<sup>1</sup> There must be men of a nice sense of honor, of burning patriotism, high intelligence, ready and persuasive speech, moderation in action, and undaunted courage. This is the pattern of a true gentleman; and Harrington held men of this pattern to be absolutely necessary in a constitutional commonwealth as legislators, generals, and judges. We have advanced little further than this to-day. The perfect democratic government must build on fundamental principles. These belong not to men, nor to nations, nor to human laws. "To build upon such principles as are apparently laid by God in the inevitable necessity or law of nature is that which truly appertains to men, to nations, and to human laws. To make any other fundamentals, and then to build upon them, is to build castles in the air."<sup>2</sup> Having a well-framed constitution that recognizes these natural forces and holds them in due equilibrium, it must be managed by men of intelligence, honor, and virtue. The great problem, then, to be solved in the United States, as Harrington would hold were he here, is this: How is it possible, at regularly recurring intervals for an indefinite period, to bring the right men to the conduct of affairs? If this problem shall prove insoluble, democratic government will end. To plead that good men are sufficient to carry on a government permanently without good laws is the cry of a demagogue; to insist that good men are essential to give life and vitality to good laws is the utterance of a statesman.

The main requirement in a republic for the continual generation of good men to hold office is the conviction of the people that such men are necessary to their welfare. If there is a constant demand, there will, according to laws in general operation, be a sufficient supply. In this way, under God, the people have their destinies in their own hands. Physical nature has not degenerated in these later years, nor has wisdom nor virtue died

<sup>1</sup> Oceana, p. 75.

<sup>2</sup> Political Aphorisms, p. 520.

out of the intellect or soul of man. There must be summoned to our aid correct methods and breadth of education ; the influence of morals and religion ; high culture, including the development of that sense of delicacy and honor which, in Harrington's words, prevents a man from carving for himself at the public table ; and a positive patriotic spirit which impels him to use all legitimate efforts actively to promote the general good. These are not impossible virtues or qualities. It is the part of good men to stimulate and encourage their juniors by every reasonable effort to emulate the wisdom and virtues, both public and private, of such men as James Harrington and John Milton ; the one a mild and the other an austere republican, but each animated and supported in the most trying circumstances, whether public or domestic, by the noblest principles that control human action, and by a passionate though rational attachment to the country which gave him birth. If men such as these can be reproduced from time to time, and receive the confidence of the people, the republic, like the glorious luminaries to which our author loved to refer, may go onward with steady and melodious motion forever.

It will be well, in concluding this paper, to summarize Harrington's leading views.

1. A commonwealth should be an "empire of laws and not of men."

2. In a republic, land should be much subdivided, and there should be a large number of freeholders. Great landed estates should be discouraged as adapted to monarchical rather than to republican institutions.

3. Political liberty consists in the empire of law and not in the mere existence of freedom. Yet no one obtains his liberty *from* the law, but rather holds it *by* the law.

4. There is a natural aristocracy among men. Members of this class will in the end emerge from the masses and control public affairs. The leading function of such men is to discuss and disclose political truth which in the end their fellow-citizens will recognize and adopt.

5. Government derives its *just* powers from the consent of the governed.

6. There should be a written constitution limiting the sovereign power of the people. This constitution should be adopted by the people.

7. The powers of government are threefold : legislative, executive, and judicial. These should be vested in different persons.

8. There should be two houses of Parliament, one more numerous than the other, and the members should be chosen by the people in convenient districts.

9. A legislative body should have a continuous life, though its membership should gradually change by means of a regular plan. This plan is that of "partial rotation," whereby, for example, one-third of the number might go out of office annually or biennially. This scheme unites gradual change of membership with continuity of the existence of the body itself. This plan may be extended to other political organizations.

10. Elections should take place by ballot. The ballot must be secret, and suitable laws devised to preserve its purity. "The suffrage is the health, if not the life of the state. By it the soul is breathed into the sovereign power."

11. The commonwealth should not engage in war without the consent of the senate and the people.

12. Those who govern must be at times in the condition of the governed. In other words, the magistracy must from time to time return to the body of the people. Life tenure is not admissible.

13. Equality before the law is the life blood of a commonwealth. Still, the government will not be well administered unless gentlemen are at its head. By gentlemen are meant not merely men of rank or wealth, but men of a nice sense of honor, sterling patriotism, and earnest in rendering disinterested service to the commonwealth. Proper measures must be taken to induce the citizens to choose such men.

14. There should be gratuitous education for the masses, if necessary. It should also be compulsory, if not voluntarily accepted. This is in the interest of the commonwealth. Uni-

versity education must be encouraged for those who can profit by it.

15. Public affairs must be administered in a broad and liberal spirit. Salaries should be commensurate with the service rendered. There should be no penny-wise economy. The element of beauty is not to be neglected.

16. There must be liberty of conscience for all Protestant Christians. No distinction should be made between members of the various Protestant sects as to freedom in worship, and the right to hold office. "Without liberty of conscience, civil liberty cannot be perfect; without civil liberty, liberty of conscience cannot be perfect."

17. Primogeniture in the descent of land is not suited to a republic.

18. Mercenary marriages are odious in a free commonwealth.

19. Public office is a public trust, and the magistracy should at all times be accountable to the people for their management of public affairs.

20. Prisoners charged with state crimes are entitled to be heard by counsel.<sup>1</sup>

21. The great end and aim of a commonwealth is the vindication of common right and the upholding of the law of nature. Rightly organized, it supplies its citizens an intense stimulus for thorough and honest work.

22. Ministers of the gospel should not hold office. Political activity might tend to corrupt them, or to corrupt religion. Their disability to hold office should be established by law.

23. There should be public parks and other lawful means of recreation provided for the people. The despoiling of parks and noted public buildings is not admissible, in general, even

<sup>1</sup> In this matter, as elsewhere, Harrington works out his theory to the last practical detail. In a state trial, the counsel for the plaintiff, or accuser, standing upon the right hand of the court, shall speak one hour and a half by the hour glass, and no longer. While papers are read, or witnesses examined, the sands are not to run. The accused, standing on the left, and *appearing if he will by counsel*, is governed by the same rules. This is a remarkable provision in the interests of justice, for prisoners under criminal charges could not appear in an English court by counsel having the right to speak in their behalf, until long after Harrington's time.

in time of war. Ministers who discountenance dancing and other amusements not in themselves harmful, act unwisely.

24. In a republic, a great general, or a great magistrate should, after a time, voluntarily, when the interests of the commonwealth admit of it, lay aside office and retire to private citizenship. Let him testify that the sovereignty and welfare of the people are greater than the claims of any citizen, however eminent or meritorious.

25. Government needs not only well-devised schemes, but the most prudent and religious choice of public servants that can possibly be made.

THEODORE W. DWIGHT.